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Wal-Mart® has created tremendous economic benefits for consumers by providing more 
choices at lower prices.  The benefits are felt especially in communities that had only local re-
tail monopolies prior to the arrival of the store.  Yet no retailer evokes stronger negative emo-
tions than this chain.  Recent media attention has focused on questionable labor practices and 
low wages combined with lack of benefits paid by the corporation, while academic studies 
have examined effects of the stores on retail wages, employment levels and numbers of estab-
lishments.  Missing from the literature is an analysis of whether the “Wal-Mart effect” is large 
enough to measurably influence community-wide family poverty rates over time.  This is the 
first study to carefully and comprehensively examine whether a relationship exists between 
existing and new locations of Wal-Mart stores and county-wide family poverty rates. 
 
                                                 
1 The research underlying this paper was supported in part by NRI Competitive Grants Program 03-35401-12936.  
Goetz is Professor of Agricultural and Regional Economics and Swaminathan is a Post-Doctoral scholar.  Opin-




Local leaders and academic researchers are increasingly interested in the community-level ef-
fects of “big box” retailers and discount department stores.  Wal-Mart®, in particular, has re-
ceived considerable and mostly negative recent media attention, in addition to spawning a 
number of hostile web-sites.
2  The interest in Wal-Mart is not surprising as it has no equal 
among big box retailers.  With total revenues of $256 billon in 2003, Wal-Mart Stores Inc. is 
the largest corporation in the world.  Wal-Mart employs 1.3 million workers worldwide and 
operates 4,750 stores (3,600 in the US).  Because of its size, purchasing power and technologi-
cal sophistication, the chain is revolutionizing not only the industrial organization of local re-
tail trade, but also the wholesale and transportation logistics industries.  BusinessWeek recently 
described the “Wal-Mart effect” in a cover story,
3 referring to the corporation’s cost efficiency 
that has contributed to economy-wide productivity gains and kept recent inflation rates at about 
one percent.  On the other hand, Wal-Mart has been blamed for the loss of US manufacturing 
jobs and the demise of mom-and-pop-type retailers. 
 
  This study examines the impact of Wal-Mart stores on county-level family poverty 
rates in the US.  The analysis is relevant to local policy-makers as they debate the pros and 
cons of having Wal-Mart and other “big box” retailers locate in their communities.  The attrac-
tion of such retailers has traditionally been viewed as a viable strategy for stimulating local 
                                                 
2 Two prominent examples are www.walmartwatch.com and www.walmartsucks.com; bumper stickers include 
“SprawlMart sucks the life out of downtown businesses.”  Other negative coverage includes a recent report that 
the chain was fined $3.1 million by the EPA for violating for the second time the Clean Water Act by failing to 
control run-off from its construction sites (Salt Lake Tribune on-line, May 13, 2004). 
3 See the October 6, 2003 issue.   4
economic growth.  However, detractors have argued that because these jobs are low-paying 
they will not help families transition out of poverty.  BusinessWeek reports that the average 
wage for an “associate” in 2001 was $8.23 per hour, for an annual income of $13,861, which 
was below the federal poverty line for a family of three at that time.  While individual workers 
have the option of working or not working for Wal-Mart, externalities are created if the chain 
raises poverty levels in the community.  In that case public tax dollars are spent on welfare pro-
grams and a disutility is created for those who are concerned with poor people living in their 
community.  The Wal-Mart phenomenon is such that (unlike Costco™) the chain keeps its 
workers’ pay at a minimum, while the rents captured by the Walton heirs position them among 




Literature   
 
Popular press articles on Wal-Mart focus on the company’s non-unionization policy and the 
provision of part-time jobs with lower wages and fewer benefits.  Considerable attention has 
also been paid to retail restructuring, usually due to loss of retail employment, decreases in the 
number of establishments, and decline of downtown shopping areas.  However, with some ex-
ceptions (e.g., Vias 2003), these articles are mostly based on case studies for specific states or 
on anecdotal evidence.  There are no academic studies that examine the impact of Wal-Mart on 
                                                 
4 As reported in Forbes magazine (2003 Special Issue on the 400 Richest People in America), widow Helen R. 
Walton and heirs S. Robson, John T., Jim C. and Alice L. Walton each had a wealth of $20.5 billion in 2003.  Al-
ternatively, at a combined total of $102.5 billion the Walton wealth is twice that controlled by Microsoft Chair-
man Bill Gates.  Only three individuals had greater wealth in 2003: William H. Gates with $46 billion, Warren 
Buffett with $36 million, and Paul Allen (also of Microsoft), $22 billion.   5
county-wide poverty rates.  Likewise, we were unable to locate any large-scale econometric 
study of Wal-Mart’s location strategy at the level of all US counties. 
 
  Basker (2003) examines the effect of Wal-Mart expansions on retail employment in 
1,749 counties and concludes (p. 19) “that Wal-Mart entry has a small positive effect on retail 
employment at the county level while reducing the number of small retail establishments in the 
county.”  Basker also finds small reductions in wholesale employment and none in the sectors 
in which the chain does not sell goods or services.  Two problems with her analysis are the use 
of a limited set of counties (truncated at employment levels above 1,500) as well as the choice 
only of employment as an impact measure.  
 
Hicks and Wilburn (2001) use a recursive time-space model to evaluate the effect of 
Wal-Mart stores on the retail trade sector in both the county in which the store is located and in 
adjacent counties in West Virginia using spatial analysis.  They control for potential endogene-
ity between population growth and entrance of Wal-Mart, but this raises the question of 
whether population growth is even a factor in Wal-Mart’s location strategy (see also Franklin 
2001).  Hicks and Wilburn cite the work of Vance and Scott (1992), who argued that the costs 
of a Wal-Mart were not as high as the benefits.  Hicks and Wilburn conclude (p. 312) that there 
“is clearly a net benefit to employment and wages in having a Wal-Mart locate in a county.”  
Furthermore, they note (p. 313) “…the criticisms leveled against Wal-Mart are a familiar re-
frain… [and that] local monopolies may have a great deal to lose from entrance by firms that 
enjoy, and exploit, economies of scale.”  As already noted, these conclusions are based on re-
sults from a single state.   6
 
Ketchum and Hughes (1997) studied Wal-Mart’s effects on employment and wages in 
Maine while Stone (1995, 1997) explored the chain’s impacts on small towns in Iowa.  These 
studies do not conclusively support the claim made by Wal-Mart’s opponents, that the entry of 
the firm is harmful to local economic growth because of a negative effect on wages, employ-
ment levels or the number of retail establishments.  All of these studies are limited in that they 
focus on only a few counties or individual states. 
 
 
Estimation Strategy, Hypotheses, and Data 
 
Our estimation strategy is simple and yet provides a fairly powerful test of the effect of Wal-
Mart on a community.  We add to an equation that predicts change in poverty rates during the 
1990s a variable measuring the change in Wal-Mart stores, appropriately instrumented to avoid 
endogeneity problems.  This sets a fairly high standard of statistical evidence for establishing 
any effect of Wal-Mart on poverty: we control for initial poverty rates as well as other known 
determinants of poverty, and examine the ceteris paribus treatment effect of adding a Wal-
Mart store on the change in the poverty rate over the subsequent period.  This procedure also 
reduces the effect of spatial cost of living differences on the change in actual or real poverty 
experienced over the period of analysis (if one can assume that the relative differences in costs 
among places did not vary). 
   7
Furthermore, we control for the presence of Wal-Mart stores at the beginning of the period 
over which change in poverty is calculated, allowing us to examine the effect both of initial 
stores and of additions of Wal-Mart stores on the change in poverty.  This is also a more com-
prehensive test of the chain’s effect in that it does not merely compare employment and wages 
in specific retail sectors before and after Wal-Mart enters a community, but rather the commu-
nity-wide effect of such an entry.  Our choice of the period 1989-1999 (conditioned by data 
availability) to measure poverty coincides with the booming decade of the 1990s, during which 
poverty rates nation-wide fell from 13.1 to 12.4 percent (US Census Bureau).  Of course, one 
key factor that our study does not capture is that Wal-Mart likely lowers prices paid by con-
sumers in the community in the short- to medium-run. 
 
US counties are the unit of analysis and the data are obtained from a variety of secon-
dary sources.  The research builds on Rupasingha and Goetz (2003), who analyze the structural 
determinants of poverty in the US, including local social capital and political influence.  Since 
the location of Wal-Mart stores is likely to be non-random, i.e., Wal-Mart location decisions 
are based on identifiable county characteristics, we account for potential endogeneity using in-
strumental variables.  Following Rupasingha and Goetz (2003), we also use spatial economet-
ric methods to test for the effects of spatial clustering.  This allows us to examine spatial spill-
overs across county borders that are not already captured in the pull factor. 
 
Thus, we estimate the following model recursively: 
 
   8
(1)  ∆WM0+t = f1(Ω0, POV0, WM0) 
 
(2)  ∆POV0+t = f2(Ψ0, POV0, WM0, ∆WM0+t) 
 
where WM0 is the number of WalMart stores in 1987, ∆WM0+t  the net change in stores be-
tween 1987 and 1998,
5 ∆WM0+t  is the change predicted (instrumented) from equation 1,  
Ω0 contains regressors affecting the Wal-Mart location decision, POV0 is the beginning-of-
period (1989) poverty rate, ∆POV0+t the change in the poverty rate over the decade, and Ψ0 in-
corporates regressors affecting the change in poverty over the decade.  Maps 1 and 2 show 
Wal-Mart locations in 1987 as well as the spread of new stores through 1998.  
 
  In terms of regressors to include in Ω0, we hypothesize that Wal-Mart locates in coun-
ties with a high pull factor, interstate highway access, more female labor force participation (to 
have a larger pool of workers), more purchasing power as reflected in earnings and educational 
attainment, and that it avoids communities with higher poverty rates and existing Wal-Mart 
stores.  Thus, we are able to test empirically the question of whether or not Wal-Mart is drawn 
into communities with higher poverty rates.  In addition, we hypothesize that communities with 
higher levels of social capital, greater political competition and more self-employed workers 
are better able to organize to prevent Wal-Mart stores from locating in their communities.  
Wal-Mart avoids counties with higher population density (at least until recently) in part be-
cause of higher land costs in these counties, and while the chain has traditionally located in ru-
ral communities, it also avoids less populated, more remote places.  We also include state fixed 
                                                 
5 The beginning year was chosen to coincide with the Economic Census of 1987 and precede the year 1989 for the 
poverty measure, while 1998 was chosen to be as close as possible to and yet precede the 1999 poverty measure.   9
effects to, among other factors, capture differences in state policy and population growth rates 
that may affect Wal-Mart’s location strategy.  Finally, this equation is formulated as a Tobit 
model because the dependent variable is for practical purposes censored at zero.
6 
 
  For the specification of regressors in the change in poverty equation (Ψ0), we draw on 
Rupasingha and Goetz (2003), who model poverty as a function of individual-level characteris-
tics, economic factors, social capital variables and political factors.  We add to this equation 
the beginning-period number of Wal-Mart stores (WM0) as well as the change in the number of 
stores (∆WM0+t) over time, instrumented using equation (1).  We also control for state fixed 
effects.  Because poverty tends to occur in clusters at the county-level, we test for spatial de-
pendence bias.   
 
Wal-Mart store location information for 1987 and 1998 is obtained from the Directory 
of Chain Stores and from the Wal-Mart edition of the Rand McNally Atlas.  The dependent 
variable is extracted from the 2000 US Census Summary File 3 data sets.  The county-level 
variables describing structural forces, political involvement and measures of social capital are 
compiled from a variety of secondary data sources and described in more detail in Rupasingha, 






                                                 
6 About 1 percent of counties (31) had a smaller number of stores in 1998 than in 1987.   10
Results 
 
Summary statistics for the regressors are reported in the Appendix Table.  Table 1 provides 
partial derivatives of regression coefficients, evaluated at the conditional means for all observa-
tions, for net new Wal-Mart store locations between 1987 and 1998.  The pull factor, existing 
Wal-Mart stores (WM0), adults with a college degree, social capital stocks, self-employment, 
interstate highway access and earnings power each have the expected signs and are statistically 
significant at below the 1 percent level.  The effect of population density is negative (although 
not distinguishable statistically from zero), while the non-metro counties each have fewer new 
stores than metro counties, all else equal.   
 
  In terms of state fixed-effects, the following states had more new Wal-Mart stores (rela-
tive to Wyoming): Arizona, California, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, West 
Virginia and Wisconsin.  Especially noteworthy is the absence of Nevada from this list, despite 
the fact that no state experienced more rapid population growth in relative terms over the pe-
riod studied.  In sharp contrast, Pennsylvania is one of the slowest-growing states in the nation, 
and yet it attracted a number of stores.  From this we conclude that rapid population growth 
may not be a prerequisite for new Wal-Mart store locations.  
 
  We next turn to our equation of primary interest, change in the poverty rate.  Holding 
constant the initial (1989) poverty rate, the results show that counties with more Wal-Mart 
stores (in 1987) had a higher poverty rate in 1999 (or a smaller reduction in the rate) than did   11
counties with fewer or no Wal-Mart stores in 1987.  Equally important, counties in which new 
Wal-Mart stores were built between 1987 and 1998 also experienced higher poverty rates, ce-
teris paribus.  The marginal effect of another Wal-Mart store on the average poverty rate was 
0.25, while that of existing stores was 0.08 percentage points.  The other coefficients had ef-
fects that were similar to those already reported in Rupasingha and Goetz (2003), and we do 
not discuss them further here. 
 
  This raises the question of why Wal-Mart affects county poverty rates.  First is the ob-
vious fact that poverty rates will rise if retail workers displaced from existing mom-and-pop 
type operations work for Wal-Mart at lower wages because they have no alternatives (this as-
sertion has been contested in the literature), all else equal.  Second, even though Wal-Mart 
Corp. presents itself as a “good local citizen” and engaged in local philanthropy through the 
Sam Walton Foundation in the amount of $106.9 million 2003 alone,
7 this type of philanthropy 
may not be as extensive or effective as that which the displaced mom-and-pop type stores 
would have provided. 
 
  A third and perhaps more subtle effect may be that, by destroying the local class of en-
trepreneurs, the Wal-Mart chain also destroys local leadership capacity.  This has been pointed 
to by rural sociologists and others as one outcome of the increasing concentration of non-local 
bank ownership and the resulting branch plant economy that is believed to have destroyed the 
pool of local leadership talent.  The destruction of small, locally-owned businesses may also 
reduce social capital levels, as has been suggested, for example, by T. Lyson (pers. comm..  
                                                 
7 Source: http://www.wffhome.com/Grant%20Awards.htm; accessed May 8, 2004.  This amount represents about 
one-tenth of one percent of the estimated wealth of the Wal-Mart heirs.    12
2002).  Thus, the elimination of a substantial number of local leaders from among a key group 





After carefully and comprehensively accounting for other local determinants of poverty, we 
find that Wal-Mart unequivocally raised family poverty rates in US counties during the 1990s.  
This was true not only as a consequence of existing stores, but it was also an independent out-
come of the contemporaneous construction of new stores between 1987 and 1998.  This hap-
pened even as average poverty rates declined nation-wide.  The question whether the cost of 
higher poverty is offset by the benefits of lower prices and wider choices available to consum-
ers in counties with Wal-Mart stores cannot be answered here. 
 
However, if Wal-Mart does indeed “cause” poverty to rise, then it is not bearing the full eco-
nomic and social costs of its business practices.  Instead, Wal-Mart transfers income from tax-
payers though welfare-programs directed at the poor to stockholders and the heirs of the Wal-
Mart fortune as well as to consumers.  Regardless of the distributional effects, the Wal-Mart 
business model allows substantial rents to be extracted from the economy. 
   13
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Table 1: Wal-Mart® TOBIT Store Location and SEM Poverty Equations    
Variable Coeff  t-stat    Coeff  t-stat    
Constant -1.234 -4.32 *** 7.446  2.75  *** 
Family poverty rate, 1989  -0.0010 -0.30   -0.522 
-
33.59  *** 
Initial stores, 1987  -0.032 -2.91 *** 0.081  1.73  * 
New stores (predicted)        0.252  2.50  ** 
Interstate highway  0.060 2.71 ***      
Pull Factor  0.313 7.75 ***      
Earnings/job [capita]  0.041 4.75 ***      
Prop. Tax per capita  -0.0055 -0.96        
Population density  -0.0056 -1.26        
Female LFPR  0.0030 1.17   -0.064  -6.32  *** 
HISSOM90 0.0060 2.20 **  -0.082  -8.08  *** 
COLL90 0.013 5.52 *** -0.039  -2.81  *** 
SELEMP90 -0.016 -6.09 *** -0.042  -4.41  *** 
Employment growth        0.276  0.39   
Employment rate        -0.093  -4.34  *** 
Industrial churning        0.045  3.31  *** 
Ag sector employment        0.019  2.18  ** 
Goods employment        -0.0018  -0.23   
Transportation employment        -0.022  -1.18   
Wholesale/retail empl.        0.0077  0.54   
Finance, Ins., Real Estate empl.        -0.022  -0.73   
Service sector employment        0.046  3.69  *** 
Jobs losses to NAFTA        0.079  3.12  *** 
Pop. 0-17 years of age        0.196  8.73  *** 
Pop. 18-24 years of age        0.018  1.06   
Pop. 65 years of age and above       -0.0062  -0.31   
Non-black minority        0.018  2.26  ** 
Stayers (predicted)        6.751  4.16  *** 
Foreign born popl (%)        0.0060  0.37   
Ethnic index        3.057  7.28  *** 
Income inequality        1.635  4.54  *** 
Federal grants/capita        0.00016  2.20  ** 
Rauch measure        -0.0027  -0.56   
Political competition  -0.0012 -0.69   0.024  3.85  *** 
Social capital index  -0.052 -3.88 *** -0.093  -1.87  * 
NONMET4 -0.206 -4.82 *** 0.498  2.68  *** 
NONMET5 -0.151 -3.14 *** 0.551  2.66  *** 
NONMET6 -0.226 -6.82 *** 0.249  1.83  * 
NONMET7 -0.241 -6.60 *** 0.607  4.08  *** 
NONMET8 -0.589 -7.54 *** 0.325  1.82  * 
NONMET9 -0.639 -10.4 *** 0.745  4.10  *** 
Sigma 0.294   ***      
lambda                     0.229  25.94  *** 
Significance levels: *=10%, **=5% and ***=1% or lower.         
Note: SEM refers to the spatial error model.           16
 
Appendix Table: Summary Statistics for Variables Used in the Regressions   
Variable Definition  Mean  Std.Dev. Minimum  Maximum
CHG8798  Chg in poverty rate, 1987-98  0.5539 1.2711 0  21
FAMPOV89 Family  poverty  rate, 1989  13.07 6.92 1.35  56.90
INEQ89  Income Inequality, 1989  1.458 0.135 1.115  3.738
PULLFAC  Pull factor, 1990  0.877 0.303 0.031  3.950
WAL87 Wal-Mart®  stores,  1987  0.40 0.89 0  16
FLF90  Female labor force part., 1990  51.88 7.10 25.76  84.08
HISSOM90  High school plus grads, 1990 (%)  56.18 7.49 24.84  74.95
COLL90  College grads, 1990 (%) 13.37 6.38 3.69  53.42
POLCOM92 Political  competition, 1992  8.86 6.69 0.00  39.79
SKI90PCM  Social capital index, 1990  0.01 1.35 -4.26  9.91
SELEMP90  Self-employment rate, 1990  17.32 5.24 1.42  43.88
HWYDUM  Highway interstate access ramp  0.427 0.495 0  1
PCEARN87  Earnings per job, 1987  10.921 1.613 2.794  21.184
PCPTAX87  Property taxes per capita, 1987  4.183 3.190 0.0000005  29.537
POPDEN87  Population denisty, 1987  0.266 1.982 0.0004774  81.573
          
YINEQ  Growth in Wal-Mart® stores* 0.581 0.809 0.00002  5.575
CHGEMP90  Growth in private jobs, 1988-1990  0.035 0.054 -0.493  0.447
EMP90  Employment rate, 1990  93.325 3.028 69.466  100.000
ISC8890  Industrial churn, 1988-1990  0.341 2.610 0.005  82.154
AG90  Ag F For employment, 1990 (%)  10.3 9.2 0.3  70.6
GOODS90  Manufacturing employ (%)  27.3 10.2 3.9  59.9
TRANS90  Trans, public utilities employ (%)  6.5 2.1 1.9  28.5
WHRET90 Wholesale/retail  employment (%)  19.7 3.4 5.8  35.5
FIRE90  Fin, ins, real estate empl (%)  4.4 1.8 0.0  17.1
SERVIC90  Service sector empl (%)  28.8 5.7 13.2  72.7
JBLOSS  Job losses to NAFTA  0.347 1.321 0.000  32.288
A017A90  Pop 0-17 years, percent, 1990  26.9 3.4 15.1  45.1
A1824A90  Pop 18-24 years, percent  9.3 3.4 3.5  34.5
A65OV90  Pop 65 yrs and older, percent  15.0 4.3 1.4  34.1
NONBLK90  Non-black minority share, 1990  3.8 7.3 0.0  94.9
PRDSTY90  Non-moving hh shares, 1985-90*  0.749 0.050 0.436  0.931
FBPOP90 Foreign-born  population, percent  2.16 3.41 0.00  36.36
ETHNIC90 Ethnic  inequality  index 0.174 0.167 0.001  0.659
FEDGNT90  Federal grants per capita ($), 1990  472.4 504.3 -1188.1  9652.4
RAUCH90 Consumption  spending (Rauch)  88.5 7.0 17.0  99.8
NONMET4  Beale code county = 4  0.043 0.203 0  1
NONMET5 etc.  0.035 0.185 0  1
NONMET6   0.200 0.400 0  1
NONMET7   0.213 0.410 0  1
NONMET8   0.081 0.273 0  1
NONMET9     0.164 0.371 0  1
Number of cases=3,004 US counties         
*denotes a predicted value from an auxiliary equation         17
 